Digital Experience in Opaque World

Observe Ability



Observe Ability

Your partner in Observability Architectures



Agenda

- Introduction
- An Open Letter
- How do we Observe
- Challenges
- Better Observability
- Wrap up



Digital Experience

"The way people interact digitally with your organization or service"

An Open Letter

An Open Letter



Michael Kanaan

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Today, I am writing an open letter echoing some recent servicemember frustrations regarding computers in the Department of Defense. These are voices that have gone unheard for far too long. It's titled: "Fix Our Computers"

Dear DoD,

You tell us to accelerate change or lose, then fix our computers.

Before buying another plane, tank, or ship, fix our computers.

Dear DoD,

You tell us to accelerate change or lose, then fix our computers.

Before buying another plane, tank, or ship, fix our computers.

Yesterday, I spent an hour waiting just to log-on. Fix our computers.

Before spending another dollar on a Request for Proposals from industry asking for the same thing you asked for last year, fix our computers.

Want innovation? You lost literally HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS of employee hours last year because computers don't work. Fix our computers.

Are you reading inputs from any of the various idea/innovation programs? Fix our computers.

I Googled how much the computer under my desk costs in the real-world. It was \$108 dollars. Would you ever buy a \$100 dollar computer? Fix our computers.

Are you a senior leader visiting a unit? Ask if their computers work.

I opened an Excel file today . . . my computer froze and needed to be restarted. Fix our computers.

I turned on my computer and it sat at 100% CPU usage. Fix our computers.

Tanium battling McAfee for scans all day takes up 40% of the processes inside the machine. Fix our computers.

My computer updated and restarted 10 times today. Fix our computers.

We've been doing more with less for too long. Fix our computers.

What happened to the cloud? Fix our computers.

Why am I using Internet Explorer? Fix our computers.

Making computers so useless that nobody can hack them is not a strategy (yet they hack them anyway). Fix our computers.

We're the richest and most well funded military in the world. I timed 1 hour and 20 minutes from logging in to Outlook opening today. Fix our computers.

Ultimately, we can't solve problems with the same tools that made them . . . and yet somehow fundamental IT funding is still an afterthought . . . it's not a money problem, it's a priority problem.

Sincerely and on behalf of,

Every DoD employee.

An Open Letter

Recommendations

•	Rec #1: Implement Endpoint Monitoring Across ALL Devices and Prioritize DoD IT Fundir	ng
	to Consistently Monitor and to Improve End-user Experience	33
•	Rec #2: Leverage Metrics for IT User Experience to Drive Accountability from Service	
	Providers and to Deliver Acceptable Quality of Service	38
•	Rec #3: Review and Upgrade Device Replacement Strategy and Device Life Cycle	
	Management	44
•	Rec #4: Simplify Security Layers, Move Faster to Zero Trust/Application-Level Security	48
•	Rec #5: Establish/Designate Permanent Chief Experience Officers	50
•	Rec #6: Centralize Acquisition and Vendor Negotiations Where Possible	53
•	Rec #7: Streamline, Standardize, and Consolidate Help Desks Across the DoD	55
•	Rec #8: Centralize Reference Architecture, Network, and Security Standards Under DoD	
	CIO and Federate Delivery and User Experience Accountability to the MILDEP CIOs	57
•	Rec #9: Clearly Define DISA's Role in the Unclassified User Experience	59

33

"Fix our Computers

Why is this so hard?

- 1. Complexity of the environment
- 2. Administrative control
- 3. MTTI vs MTTR
- 4. Problems asking and answering the right questions
- 5. Improvements in cyber security posture
- 6. Lack of Observability and capability.

Monitoring & Observability

Monitoring

- 1. Is a service up or down?
- 2. What was the latency between X & Y?
- 3. What was the link utilization over the last 5 minutes?



Observabili

- 1. Why did person X have trouble logging in?
- 2. Why was this transaction slow?
- 3. What was the DB query that caused a lock?
- 4. What path did this traffic take through the network?

How do we Observe?

How do we Observe?

Metrics

- CPU Utilisation
- Disk Queue Length
- Packets per Second

Events

- Exceptions
- Alerts
- Creation of an object
- Traps

Logs

- Syslog
- Event Logs
- Application Logs
- Kernel logs

Traces

- Application Traces
- Packet traces
- Kernel tracing (eBPF)

Metrics



Events



Alert Details

Network Alerts Group/Site Alerts Device Alerts Interface Alerts ANP Alerts Interface Alerts ANP Alerts Interface Alerts Alerts Alerts CP Port Test Alerts Ping Test Alerts Database Test Alerts DNS Test Alerts LDAP Test Alerts Script Test Alerts

Severity	Alert Profile	Site	Object	Timestamp	Category	IP Address	Metric Class	Metric	Value	Violation	Details
📕 Info	Default Alert	Americas_US	SCLA-JN-AG	Aug 31st 2021,	Metric Thresh	10.47.17.114	CPU_UTIL	cpuUtil	17 %	>-1.0	
Major	Default Alert	Americas_US	SCLA-JN-AG	Aug 31st 2021,	Metric Thresh	10.47.17.114	CPU_UTIL	cpuUtil	100 %	> 91.0	
Info	Default Alert	<u>Asia_CN</u>	SP1.ndab.nbtt	Aug 31st 2021,	Metric Thresh	10.47.17.97	DEV_STATUS	rtt	19.34 ms	>-1.0	
Minor	Default Alert	Americas_BR	Router A.nda	Aug 31st 2021,	Metric Thresh	10.47.17.230	DEV_STATUS	rtt	148.09 ms	>99.0	
Minor	Default Alert	Americas_US	DUR4	Aug 31st 2021,	Metric Thresh	10.47.16.222	DEV_STATUS	rtt	136.23 ms	>99.0	
Minor	Default Alert	Americas US	DUR5	Aug 31st 2021,	Metric Thresh	10.47.16.223	DEV_STATUS	rtt	105.43 ms	>99.0	
📕 Info	Default Alert	Africa_EG	VPNSPOKE1.n	Aug 31st 2021,	Metric Thresh	10.47.17.103	DEV_STATUS	rtt	85.63 ms	> -1.0	
Minor	Default Alert	Americas US	DUR3	Aug 31st 2021,	Metric Thresh	10.47.16.221	DEV_STATUS	rtt	180.71 ms	>99.0	

1 to 8 of more IK K Page 1 of more > >I

Logs

Console

Start Now Activities Clear Reload Info Share

All Messages Errors and Fault

F	ile Na	me						Date			~ Kind					
l	aunch	nd.lo	og					13/11/2023, 1:34 pm			Syste	n				
v	vifi.lo	g						13/11/2023, 12:30 am	ì		Syste	n				
s	vster	n.lo	a					13/11/2023, 12:17 am			Svste	n				
2	023-	.11_'	3 13 log log	1				13/11/2023 12:10 am			Liser					
4	020-		13_10g.10g	•				13/11/2023, 12:10 and			0361					
MUI		11-	12 197 100	. 100	บรม	HUSL	NOLTITCALION	12/11/2023 5:46 am	пелтсе	power	IS OIT SEQUUM	000/3	тогат	o cng	ט נ	enø
Mon	Nov	13	08:37:21	.623	Usb	Host	Notification	Apple80211Set: seqNum	55574	Total	0 chg 0 en0					
Mon	Nov	13	08:37:21	.670	Usb	Host	Notification	Apple80211Set: seqNum	55575	Total	0 chg 0 en0					
Mon	Nov	13	08:52:49	.456	Usb	Host	Notification	Error Apple80211Set:	Device	power	is off seqNum	55576	Total	0 ch	g 0	en0
Mon	Nov	13	08:52:49	.835	Usb	Host	Notification	Apple80211Set: seqNum	55577	Total	0 chg 0 en0					
Mon	Nov	13	08:52:49	.868	Usb	Host	Notification	Apple80211Set: seqNum	55578	Total	0 chg 0 en0					
Mon	Nov	13	08:54:16	.094	Usb	Host	Notification	Error Apple80211Set:	Device	power	is off seqNum	55579	Total	0 ch	g 0	en0
Mon	Nov	13	08:54:16	.507	Usb	Host	Notification	Apple80211Set: seqNum	55580	Total	0 chg 0 en0					
Mon	Nov	13	08:54:16	.542	Usb	Host	Notification	Apple80211Set: seqNum	55581	Total	0 chg 0 en0					
Mon	Nov	13	08:55:29	.503	Usb	Host	Notification	Error Apple80211Set:	Device	power	is off seqNum	55582	Total	0 ch	g 0	en0
Mon	Nov	13	08:55:29	.869	Usb	Host	Notification	Apple80211Set: seqNum	55583	Total	0 chg 0 en0					
Mon	Nov	13	08:55:29	.902	Usb	Host	Notification	Apple80211Set: seqNum	55584	Total	0 chg 0 en0					
Mon	Nov	13	08:56:29	.501	Usb	Host	Notification	Error Apple80211Set:	Device	power	is off seqNum	55585	Total	0 ch	g 0	en0
Mon	Nov	13	08:56:29	.897	Usb	Host	Notification	Apple80211Set: seqNum	55586	lotal	0 chg 0 en0					
Mon	NOV	13	08:56:29	.934	USD	Host	Notification	Apple80211Set: seqNum	5558/	lotal	0 chg 0 eh0		T - 4 - 3	0 - 1		
Mon	NOV	13	08:57:29	.484	USD	HOST	Notification	Error Apple80211Set:	Device	power	1s off seqNum	55588	ιοται	0 ch	g 0	enø
MOR	NOV	13	08:57:29	.802	USD	HOST	Notification	Apple80211Set: seqNum	55589	Total	0 chg 0 eh0					
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Mon		12	00:00:30	.001	Usb	Host	Notification	Apple80211Set: SeqNum	55502	Total	e chy e ene					
Mor	Nov	12	00.00.00	.094	lich	Host	Notification	Error Apple80211Set. SeqNum	Device	nower	is off sorNum	55504	Total	A ch	1 0	en0
mon			00.07.00													CIU

Traces

	No. ^ Time	Delta Time Source	Destination	Protocol	Source Port Connect	ion Number Lengt	h Spin E	Bit	Info	
	1 0.000000	0.000000000 192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	QUIC	57844	0	1292		<pre>Initial, DCID=3d8dd26950ebed59, PKN: 1, PING, PA</pre>	ADDING,
	2 0.001041	0.001041000 192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	QUIC	57844	0	115		0-RTT, DCID=3d8dd26950ebed59	
	3 0.001189	0.000148000 192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	QUIC	57844	0	803		0-RTT, DCID=3d8dd26950ebed59	
LIRI	4 0.042316	0.041127000 192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	QUIC	57844	0	138		0-RTT, DCID=3d8dd26950ebed59	
O'NE	5 0.064602	0.022286000 192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	QUIC	57844	0	157		0-RTT, DCID=3d8dd26950ebed59	
	6 0.072021	0.007419000 192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	QUIC	57844	0	133		0-RTT, DCID=3d8dd26950ebed59	
	7 0.082136	0.010115000 142.250.70.164	192.168.20.12	QUIC	443	0	1292		Initial, SCID=fd8dd26950ebed59, PKN: 1, ACK, PAL	DDING
	8 0.142357	0.060221000 142.250.70.164	192.168.20.12	QUIC	443	0	1292	False	Protected Payload (KP0)	
	9 0.142656	0.000299000 192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	QUIC	57844	0	120		Handshake, DCID=fd8dd26950ebed59	
	10 0.143651	0.000995000 142.250.70.164	192.168.20.12	QUIC	443	0	856	False	Protected Payload (KP0)	
	11 0.143735	0.000084000 192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	OUIC	57844	0	73	False	Protected Payload (KP0), DCID=fd8dd26950ebed59	
	12 0.144580	0.000845000 142.250.70.164	192,168,20,12	OUIC	443	0	192	False	Protected Payload (KP0)	
	13 0.145048	0.000468000 142.250.70.164	192,168,20,12	OUIC	443	0	66	False	Protected Payload (KP0)	
	14 0.169910	0.024862000 192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	OUTC	57844	0	74	False	Protected Payload (KP0), DCTD=fd8dd26950ebed59	
	15 0.194549	0.024639000 142.250.70.164	192.168.20.12	OUTC	443	â	162	False	Protected Payload (KP0)	
	16 0.194828	0.000279000 142.250.70.164	192.168.20.12	OUTC	443	õ	67	False	Protected Payload (KP0)	
and front and sea	17 0 194949	0.000121000 192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	OUTC	57844	â	73	False	Protected Payload (KP0) DCID=fd8dd26950ebed59	
Southerese	18 0 254142	0 059193000 142 250 70 164	192 168 20 12	OUTC	443	â	987	False	Protected Payload (KP0)	
	19 0 254474	0 000332000 192 168 20 12	142 250 70 164	OUTC	57844	0	77	False	Protected Payload (KP0) DCID=fd8dd26950ebed59	
		0.0000332000 192.100.20.12	102 169 20 12	OUTC	112	0	127	Falco	Protected Payload (KP0), DCID-1000020550656055	
Details Page L	20 0.255511	0.000037000 142.250.70.104	102 169 20 12	OUTC	445	0	754	False	Protected Payload (KPØ)	
Server Personne Time 0.053e	21 0.250445	0.001132000 142.250.70.104	142 250 70 164	OUTC	570 <i>44</i>	0	734	False	Protected Payload (KP0) DCID=fd9dd260E0chodE0	
HTTP Status 200	22 0.250013	0.0001/0000 192.108.20.12	142.250.70.104	QUIC	37044	0	104	False	Protected Payload (KP0), DCID=10000209506D6059	
+ Show More	23 0.230/34	0.000141000 142.250.70.104	192.100.20.12	QUIC	443	0	194	False	Protected Payload (KP0)	
		0.002504000 142.250.70.164	192.100.20.12	uu IL	44.3	V.	1.55	Fatse		
	Charlier SS	22 [0000	10 5/	dc 66 ab e2 2c c8 1b t8 cc 43 08 00 45 00 W	†··,· ··(·
	Checksum: 0xa98	Sz [UNVErified]					0010	14 00	01 bb c4 b8 00 37 a9 82 54 b2 bc a3 22 6a	е; Р Р 7 Т.
		is: Unveritied]					0030	79 96	e6 bd 6a 35 38 41 44 81 78 86 57 34 9c c7 v··	· 158A D·x·W
	[Stream index:	2]						cd 86	df d4 42 83 57 ad 43 ee 79 e4 60 7b 32 fb	·B·W· C·y·
	> [limestamps]							5e 9c	01 f5 0f cf b8 72 3c ^··	····r <
Span Browser	UDP payLoad (47	/ bytes)								
	✓ QUIC IETF									
Find	 QUIC Connection 	n information								
	[Connection	Number: 2]								
Span 0.0 ms	[Packet Length:	: 47]								
go-frontend-service frontend-handler	QUIC Short Head	ler								
go-frontend-service frontend-work	0 =	Header Form: Short Header (0)								
go-frontend-service HTTP POST	.1 =	Fixed Bit: True								
Debackend-service backend-bandler	0 =	Spin Bit: False								
ap-backand-sarvice backand-work	Remaining Paylo	bad: b2bca3226a7996e6bd6a35384	14481788657349cc	7cd86dfd44	28357ad43ee79e4607b32	2				
Go-packend-service packend-work	😑 📓 🛛 Latency Spin Bit	(quic.spin_bit), 1 byte						Pa	ackets: 4768 · Displayed: 4768 (100.0%)	Profile: QUIC

Where do we Observe?

Infrastructure

- Hypervisor
- Server Infrastructure
- Routers
- Switches
- Firewalls
- Load Balancers

Applications

- Application
- Application Server
- Container
- Platform

Network

- Routers
- Switches
- vSwitches
- Firewalls
- Endpoints

Endpoints

- Mobile
- Laptop
- Desktop

Challenges

Challenges

Perspective

Silod Operations

Need to Know

SRE Mindset

Evolution

Software Lifecycle

Technology Evolution

Scaling

Cyber Very Necessary

Cannot Secure What we Cannot See

Passive Monitoring Becoming Hard

Perspective – Silos

MUST BE

"NETWORK ISSUES"

Perspective – SRE Mindset



HOW GOOGLE RUNS PRODUCTION SYSTEMS

O'REILLY°

Edited by Betsy Beyer, Chris Jones, Jennifer Petoff & Niall Richard Murphy



Practical Ways to Implement SRE

Edited by Betsy Beyer, Niall Richard Murphy, David K. Rensin, Kent Kawahara & Stephen Thorne



Evolution – HTTP

Apply a display filter ... < #/> + Time Delta Time Source Protocol | Length | Method | Request URI Path Info No. Destination 1 0.000000 0.00000000 192.168.20.12 192.168.20.10 TCP 56574 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 78 80 → 56574 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win= 2 0.029457 0.029457000 192.168.20.10 192.168.20.12 TCP 74 56574 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=13171 3 0.029573 0.000116000 192.168.20.12 192.168.20.10 TCP 66 4 0.030131 0.000558000 192.168.20.12 192.168.20.10 HTTP 428 GET http://192.168.20.10/ GET / HTTP/1.1 5 0.033304 0.003173000 192.168.20.10 192.168.20.12 TCP 80 → 56574 [ACK] Seg=1 Ack=363 Win=435 66 6 0.079393 0.046089000 192.168.20.10 192.168.20.12 HTTP 724 200 http://192.168.20.10/ HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html) 7 0.079532 0.000139000 192.168.20.12 192.168.20.10 TCP 56574 → 80 [ACK] Seg=363 Ack=659 Win=1 66 8 30.1085... 30.029052000 192.168.20.12 192.168.20.10 TCP 66 56574 → 80 [FIN, ACK] Seq=363 Ack=659 9 30.1143... 0.005753000 192.168.20.10 192.168.20.12 TCP 66 80 → 56574 [FIN, ACK] Seg=659 Ack=364 10 30.1145... 0.000212000 192.168.20.12 192.168.20.10 TCP 66 56574 → 80 [ACK] Seq=364 Ack=660 Win=:

Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n Connection: keep-alive\r\n ETag: W/'64f93af0-267"\r\n Content-Encoding: gzip\r\n \r\n [HTTP response 1/1]	0040 72 f3 48 0050 4b 0d 0a 0060 2f 31 2e 0070 6f 6e 2c 0080 30 36 37 465 0090 6e 74 65	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	30 30 20 4f r.HTTP/1.1 200 67 69 6e 78 K.Server: ngi 65 3a 20 4d /1.22.1. ·Date 30 32 33 20 on, 18 5 ep 20 0d 0a 43 6f 06:45:45 GMT · 74 65 78 4 ntent-Type: t 44 6f 64 69 /html·l.ast-M
[Parist inc request: 0.49262000 seconds]	00c0 70 20 32	64 3a 20 54 68 75 2C 20 30 30 32 33 20 30 32 3a 35 32	37 20 53 65 fied: In u, 07 3a 33 32 20 p 2023 0 2:52:3
<pre>[Request URI: http://192.168.20.10/] > HTTP chunked response Content-encoded entity body (gzip): 397 bytes -> 615 bytes File Data: 615 bytes</pre>	00d0 47 4d 54 00e0 63 6f 64 00f0 0a 43 6f 0100 70 2d 61 0110 2f 22 36	0d 0a 54 72 61 6e 73 66 65 69 6e 67 3a 20 63 68 75 6e 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 6a 6b 65 64 0a 45 54 61 34 66 39 33 61 66 30 2d 32 32	72 2d 45 6e GMT··Tra nsfer- 6b 65 64 0d coding: chunke 20 6b 65 65 ·Connect ion: 67 3a 20 57 p-alive··ETag 36 37 22 0d /"64f93a f0-26
Line-based text data: text/html (23 lines)	0120 0a 43 6f	67 75 60 70 6d 65 6d 65 71	67 64 69 6e ·Content -Encod
<pre><!DOCTYPE html> \n</pre>	0130 07 38 20	67 78 69 70 00 08 00 08 31	38 64 00 0a g: gzip180
<html>\n</html>	Frame (724 bytes)	De-chunked entity body (397 bytes)	Uncompressed entity body (615 bytes)
Time since the request was sent (http.time)	Packet	s: 10 · Displayed: 10 (100.0%)	Profile: HTTP

Evolution – HTTPS

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ns_server_name), 20 bytes

0 🖬

Server Na

	tcp.port == 443												÷
No	. Time Delta Time Source	Destination	Protocol	Length E	BIF	RWND	RTT to ACK	Content Type	Info				
	34 3.350028 0.00000000 192.168.20.12	17.253.61.220	TCP	78		65535			55286 → 443	[SYN] Se	eq=0 Win=65535	Len=0 MSS=	
	44 3.440929 0.090901000 192.168.20.12	23.202.163.2	TCP	78		65535			55287 → 443	[SYN] Se	eq=0 Win=65535	Len=0 MSS=	- ĭ
	46 3.485723 0.044794000 17.253.61.220	192.168.20.12	TCP	74		65160	0.135695000		443 → 55286	[SYN, AC	[K] Seq=0 Ack=1	Win=65160	
	47 3.486905 0.001182000 192.168.20.12	17.253.61.220	TCP	66		131840	0.001182000		55286 → 443	[ACK] Se	eq=1 Ack=1 Win=	-131840 Len	-
	48 3.486909 0.000004000 192.168.20.12	17.253.61.220	TLSv1.3	583	517	131840		Handshake	Client Hell	0			
	49 3.487475 0.000566000 23.202.163.2	192.168.20.12	TCP	74		65160	0.046546000		443 → 55287	[SYN, AC	[K] Seq=0 Ack=1	Win=65160	-
	50 3.488198 0.000723000 192.168.20.12	23.202.163.2	TCP	66		131840	0.000723000		55287 → 443	[ACK] Se	eq=1 Ack=1 Win=	-131840 Len	
	51 3.488203 0.000005000 192.168.20.12	23.202.163.2	TLSv1.3	583	517	131840		Handshake	Client Hell	D			
	53 3.548057 0.059854000 23.202.163.2	192.168.20.12	TCP	66		64768	0.059854000		443 → 55287	[ACK] Se	eq=1 Ack=518 Wi	n=64768 Le	
	54 3.550508 0.002451000 23.202.163.2	192.168.20.12	TLSv1.3	1484	1418	64768		Handshake, Chan	Server Hell	o, Change	e Cipher Spec,	Applicatio	
	55 3.550875 0.000367000 23.202.163.2	192.168.20.12	TLSv1.3	1484	2836	64768			Continuatio	n Data			
	56 3.550877 0.000002000 23.202.163.2	192.168.20.12	TLSv1.3	1326	4096	64768			Continuatio	n Data			
	57 3.551319 0.000442000 192.168.20.12	23.202.163.2	TCP	66		130432	0.000811000		55287 → 443	[ACK] Se	eq=518 Ack=1419	Win=13043	
	58 3.551472 0.000153000 192.168.20.12	23.202.163.2	TCP	66		128384	0.000595000		55287 → 443	[ACK] Se	eq=518 Ack=4097	Win=12838	
	59 3.551720 0.000248000 23.202.163.2	192.168.20.12	TLSv1.3	1484	1418	64768			Continuatio	n Data			
	<pre>> Cipher Suites (21 suites) Compression Methods Length: 1 > Compression Methods (I method) Extensions Length: 393 > Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=0) < Extension: server_name (len=22) Type: server_name (0) Length: 25 < Server Name Indication extension Server Name List length: 23 Server Name Type: host_name (0) Server Name length: 20 Server Name length: 20 Server Name server. Length: 20 Server Name length: 20 Server Name length: 20 Server Name length: 20 Server Stengted matter secret (length) Server Stengted matter secret (length)</pre>	m n=0)					0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000	Ca C	02 13 05 CC 08 c0 12 00 19 00 17 00 2e 61 70 76 00 01 00 01 00 00 01 00 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 01 00 01 00 00 01 00 01 00 00 01 00 01 00 00 01 00 01 00 00 01 00 01 00 00 01 00 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	14 c0 13 0a 01 06 0a 01 06 6c 65 26 0a 00 00 0b 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 12 00 1d 00 22 27 ee 35 03 04 03 1a 00 00	$\begin{array}{c} 3 & 60 & 9d & 00 & 9c \\ 3 & 01 & 89 & 9a & 9a \\ 7 & 73 & 70 & 2d & 73 \\ 6 & 63 & 6f & 6d & 00 \\ c & 00 & 0a & 6a & 6a \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 23 \\ 8 & 68 & 74 & 74 & 70 \\ 0 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 03 \\ 0 & 00 & 00 $	/, sl.ls.ap plo /1.1 +.)jj f.>.xx.e ThkR: N'	gsp e.co 2 ht 7 { 5 -
	 Extension: ercleout_marter_scretct (ten=1) Extension: supported_groups (len=12) Extension: ec_point_formats (len=2) Extension: asplication_layer_protocol Extension: signature_algorithms (len= Extension: signed_certificate_timesta Extension: sage show the same start 	_negotiation (len= 24) mp (len=0)	=14)				01a0 01b0 01c0 01c0 01c0 01c0 0200 0210 0220 0230 0230 0230 0240	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	2 00 00 00 00 00 2 00 00 00 00 00 2 00 00 00 00 00 2 00 00 00 00 00 3 00 00 00 00 00 3 00 00 00 00 00 3 00 00 00 00 00 3 00 00 00 00 00 3 00 00 00 00 00 3 00 00 00 00 00 3 00 00 00 00 00 4 00 00 00 00 00 5 00 00 00 00 00 6 00 00 00 00 00		

Packets: 1958 · Displayed: 406 (20.7%) · Dropped: 0 (0.0%)

Profile: TLS

Evolution Cyber – QUIC

	No. ^ Time Delta Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Source Port Connection Numb	er Length	Spin I	Bit	Info					
	1 0.000000 0.00000000	192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	QUIC	57844	0 :	1292		Initial,	DCID=3d8c	ld26950ebe	d59, PKN: 1, PIN	IG, PADDING,	,
	2 0.001041 0.001041000	192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	QUIC	57844	0	115		0-RTT, DC	ID=3d8dd2	6950ebed5	9		
	3 0.001189 0.000148000	192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	QUIC	57844	0	803		0-RTT, DC	ID=3d8dd2	6950ebed5	9		
	4 0.042316 0.041127000	192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	QUIC	57844	0	138		0-RTT, DC	ID=3d8dd2	6950ebed5	9		
	5 0.064602 0.022286000	192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	QUIC	57844	0	157		0-RTT, DC	ID=3d8dd2	6950ebed5	9		
	6 0.072021 0.007419000	192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	QUIC	57844	0	133		0-RTT, DC	ID=3d8dd2	6950ebed5	9		
	7 0.082136 0.010115000	142.250.70.164	192.168.20.12	QUIC	443	0 :	1292		Initial,	SCID=fd8d	d26950ebe	d59, PKN: 1, ACK	, PADDING	
	8 0.142357 0.060221000	142.250.70.164	192.168.20.12	QUIC	443	0 :	1292	False	Protected	Payload	(KPØ)			
	9 0.142656 0.000299000	192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	QUIC	57844	0	120		Handshake	, DCID=fo	18dd26950e	bed59		
	10 0.143651 0.000995000	142.250.70.164	192.168.20.12	QUIC	443	0	856	False	Protected	Payload	(KPØ)			
	11 0.143735 0.000084000	192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	QUIC	57844	0	73	False	Protected	Payload	(KPØ), DC	ID=fd8dd26950ebe	ed59	
	12 0.144580 0.000845000	142.250.70.164	192.168.20.12	QUIC	443	0	192	False	Protected	Payload	(KPØ)			
	13 0.145048 0.000468000	142.250.70.164	192.168.20.12	QUIC	443	0	66	False	Protected	Payload	(KPØ)			
	14 0.169910 0.024862000	192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	QUIC	57844	0	74	False	Protected	Payload	(KP0), DC	ID=fd8dd26950ebe	ed59	
	15 0.194549 0.024639000	142.250.70.164	192.168.20.12	QUIC	443	0	162	False	Protected	Payload	(KPØ)			
	16 0.194828 0.000279000	142.250.70.164	192.168.20.12	QUIC	443	0	67	False	Protected	Payload	(KPØ)			
	17 0.194949 0.000121000	192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	QUIC	57844	0	73	False	Protected	Payload	(KP0), DC	ID=fd8dd26950ebe	ed59	
	18 0.254142 0.059193000	142.250.70.164	192.168.20.12	QUIC	443	0	987	False	Protected	Payload	(KPØ)			
	19 0.254474 0.000332000	192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	QUIC	57844	0	77	False	Protected	Payload	(KP0), DC	ID=fd8dd26950ebe	ed59	
	20 0.255311 0.000837000	142.250.70.164	192.168.20.12	QUIC	443	0	127	False	Protected	Payload	(KP0)			
	21 0.256443 0.001132000	142.250.70.164	192.168.20.12	QUIC	443	0	754	False	Protected	Payload	(KPØ)			
	22 0.256613 0.000170000	192.168.20.12	142.250.70.164	QUIC	57844	0	77	False	Protected	Payload	(KP0), DC	ID=fd8dd26950ebe	ed59	
_	23 0.256754 0.000141000	142.250.70.164	192.168.20.12	QUIC	443	0	194	False	Protected	Payload	(KPØ)			
6	24 0.259358 0.002604000	142.250.70.164	192.168.20.12	OUIC	443	0	135	False	Protected	Pavload	(KPØ)			
	Length: 55							1c 57	dc 66 a6	e2 2c c8	1b f8 cc	43 08 00 45 00	•W•f••,•	•••C••
1	Checksum: 0xa982 [unverified]						0010	00 4b	00 00 40	00 3b 11	95 50 8e	fa 46 a3 c0 a8	·K··@·;	·P··F·
	[Checksum Status: Unverified]						0020	14 0C	01 DD C4	D8 00 37	a9 82 54	DZ DC 33 ZZ 63 86 57 34 9c c7	v···i584	D . y . W4
	[Stream index: 2]						0040	cd 86	df d4 42	83 57 ad	43 ee 79	e4 60 7b 32 fb	····B·W·	C.v.`{
	<pre>> [Timestamps]</pre>							5e 9c	01 f5 0f	cf b8 72	3c		^r	<
	UDP payload (47 bytes)													
	✓ QUIC IETF													
	 QUIC Connection information 													
	[Connection Number: 2]													
	[Packet Length: 47]													
	 QUIC Short Header 													
	0 = Header Form: Sh	hort Header (0)												
1	.1 = Fixed Bit: True	e												
		e 7006a6bd6a35304	144017006572407		P257ad42aa70a4607b22									
	Remaining Payload: b2bca3226a	1799666666635384	14481788657349cc7	ca86d1d442	83578043ee79e4607b32									
	🥚 📓 Latency Spin Bit (quic.spin_bit), 1 byte	16 -						• P	ackets: 4768 ·	Displayed: 4	768 (100.0%)		Profi	ile: QUIC

Better Observability

The Point of Consumption



The Point of Consumption

Experience

1.Endpoint Agents 2.JavaScript Injection 3.Twitter



Recorded At	Application	Activity / Event	Response Time
Oct 31, 1:03:31 PM	Microsoft Outlook	Send Mail To Outbox	1 .33s
Oct 31, 12:59:42 PM	Microsoft Outlook	Send Mail To Outbox	0 1.35s
Oct 31, 12:54:28 PM	SAP	Save Record	0 5.61s
Oct 31, 12:53:31 PM	Salesforce	Contacts	0 1.25s
Oct 31, 12:26:03 PM	BranchPortal	Launch	0 3.74s
Oct 31, 12:19:42 PM	SAP	Search Account	● 10.61s
Oct 31, 12:19:17 PM	SAP	Search Account	🔴 10.51s
Oct 31, 11:59:51 AM	Microsoft Outlook	Send Mail To Outbox	● 1.08s
Oct 31, 11:59:26 AM	Microsoft Outlook	Send Mail To Outbox	0 1.54s
Oct 31, 11:55:37 AM	Skype for Busines	Audio/Video Call	● 2.3(MOS)
Oct 31, 11:54:21 AM	SAP	Save Record	0 2.71s
Oct 31, 11:52:39 AM	Salesforce	Contacts	● 1.58s
Oct 31, 11:51:08 AM	Skype for Busines	Unavailability for A	🔴 N/A
Oct 31, 11:46:36 AM	Salesforce	Open Opportunity	● 1.55s
Oct 31, 11:33:13 AM	Microsoft OneNote	Launch	9 .86s
Oct 31, 11:21:08 AM	BranchPortal	Launch	0 3.63s
Oct 31, 11:20:42 AM	SAP	Search Account	🔴 12.2s
Oct 31, 11:15:32 AM	SAP	Search Account	🛑 12.84s

(All)

Details

The Point of Distribution



Logs and Traces

......

ieign@k8s2: ~/simple_pytnon_threading

364

root@0fa215fe1eea: /data (-zsh) X1 leigh@k8s2: ~/simple_python_threading (convert) X2 leigh@k8smaster: ~ (-zsh)

leighfinch@Leighs-MacBook-Air ~ % ssh leigh@192.168.20.50 Linux k8s2 6.1.0-13-amd64 #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAWIC Debian 6.1.55-1 (2023-09-29) x86_64

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software; the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by applicable law. Last login: Fri Oct 27 16:45:55 2023 from 192.168.20.12 leigheR&S2:-/s cd simple_python_threading/ leigheR&S2:-/simple_python_threading\$



Logs and Traces



Metrics, Logs, and Traces

Layer	Examples
Application	Tracing, logs, OpenTelemetry
Presentation	eBPF trace, logs
Session	eBPF trace, ETL tracing
Transport	eBPF trace, tcpdump
Network	eBPF trace, tcpdump, netflow
Data-Link	Logs MAC flip, SNMP
Physical	Logs link flaps, SNMP

Next Generation Observability

Next Generation Observability





Streaming Telemetry







Ability to run user code within the kernel
Ability to intercept and modify traffic
BPF
Trace system calls
Ability to observe anything in the kernel

OpenTelemetry



- Open standard for APM
- Defines the protocols for MLT
- Includes working code to consume telemetry

Streaming Telemetry

Yang Explorer 0.8.0 (Beta)				O Help	jcohoe-c9300#show telemetry ietf subs	cription 501 deta	il 🔶	
Explorer search	Values	Operation	Property	Value				
Cisco-IOS-XE-process-cpu-oper 🥧			Name	five-seconds	Subscription ID: 501			
🕶 cpu-usage			Node Type	leaf	State: Valid			
🔻 🚠 cpu-utilization			Node Type		Stream: vang-push			
₽ five-seconds	<get></get>		Data Type	uint8	Filter:			
five-seconds-intr			Access	read-only	Filter type: xpath			
/ one-minute			Presence		XPath: /process-cpu-ios-xe-oper:c	pu-usage/cpu-util	ization	
🔎 five-minutes			Key		Update policy:			
🔻 🛅 cpu-usage-processes			Ney		Period: 500			
🔻 🚞 cpu-usage-process			Mandatory		Encodina: encode-kvapb			
🔎 pid			Default		Source VRF:			
🎤 name			Path	Cisco-IOS-XE-process-cpu-oper/cpu-usage/	Source Address: 10.85.134.65			
🗭 tty			Description	Busy percentage in last 5-secondsNone	Notes:			
💋 total-run-time			Description	busy percentage in last o seconds tone	Pacaivars			
invocation-count			XPath Filter	/process-cpu-ios-xe-oper.cpu-usage/cpu-ut	Address	Port	Protocol	Protocol Profile
🔎 avg-run-time								
/ five-seconds					10.85.134.71	57000	grpc-tcp	
🥟 one-minute								
💋 five-minutes								
					JCONOE-C9300#SNOW telemetry lett subs	cription Sel rece	lver	
			ak aka		receivers adscription receivers deta			
					Subscription ID: 501			
					Address: 10.85.134.71			
					Port: 57000			
					Protocol: grpc-tcp			
					State: Connected			
					Explanation:			

Summary



- •An Open Letter
- How do we Observe
- Challenges
- Better Observability
- Next Generation Observability

Thank You

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Defense Business Board Report

